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1 Introduction
Despite inconclusive evidence about the role of universities in local economic develop-
ment (Rutten and Boekema, 2009), governments are encouraging them to become
more entrepreneurial (Lawton Smith and Ho, 2006). Universities can commercialise
research knowledge and intellectual property (IP) through developing university spin-
outs (USOs), to stimulate local economic development through multiplier effects. Those
universities which are more successful at commercialising knowledge in the United
Kingdom are generally more prestigious and resource rich, and possess better net-
works with external organisations (Huggins, 2008). `Star' universities such as Oxford,
Cambridge, Imperial College, and University College London report the greatest
research income, and largest numbers of USOs, patents, and licences (Lawton Smith,
2007).
A major challenge faced by USOs in exploiting entrepreneurial opportunities is
to mobilise resources (Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004). Formal venture capital (VC)
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investment in USOs can stimulate firm growth (Colombo and Grilli, 2005). Entrepreneurs
in USOs can leverage pools of internal resources involving relevant experience, knowledge,
and social capital to send credible quality signals to outsiders to increase their likelihood
of accessing external, formal VC which provides the funding and expertise needed for
USO growth.
Formal VC concerns equity investments and specialised knowledge by formal VC
firms (Babcock-Lumish, 2009), whilst hybrid public and private equity fund invest-
ments are excluded from this definition. The inability of most USOs to generate
substantial growth (Garnsey and Heffernan, 2005) reflects a reluctance and/or inability
of entrepreneurs to obtain formal VC, often because they are unwilling to relinquish
significant equity shares (Martin et al, 2005). Some USOs obtain government-scheme
and/or business-angel finance, but do not subsequently obtain formal VC, which can
retard product development and firm growth. USOs face major challenges because
formal VC firms are reluctant to invest due to risk and information-asymmetry issues
(Huggins, 2008). These last arise because: USO entrepreneurs may have more knowl-
edge than the VC firm; the USO does not have a credible track record; the market is
new; or the entrepreneur has been intimately involved in developing the underlying
technology. To overcome information-asymmetry problems, USOs (ie, `signallers') seek-
ing finance from formal VC firms (ie, `receivers') need to assemble internally costly
resource bases which signal the credible quality sought by formal VC firms.
The formal VC market in the United Kingdom is concentrated in the most eco-
nomically developed South East England region regarding the location of fund man-
agers (Mason and Harrison, 2002). Babcock-Lumish (2009) recently detected a spatial
mismatch between investors and investees, with a thriving formal and informal VC
funder cluster in London but innovative firms (ie, `deals') scattered nationwide. A
traditional spatial proximity effects view suggests a pronounced distance-decay effect
relating to the formal VC investment behaviour of London-based offices. Need for
repeated monitoring visits to investee firms is expected to promote a spatial proximity
effect (or geographical bias) favouring investee firms located near to London-based
offices. Localities with few USOs, low deal flow, and which are distant from the major
national centre of VC offices may thus have to deal with a low-demand ^ low-supply
equilibrium for formal VC finance (Martin et al, 2005).
These arguments have led to suggestions that the heavily spatially centralised
financial VC system may retard the ability of USOs located outside the South East
of England to obtain formal VC. However, recent evidence suggests that this perspec-
tive is an oversimplification, with not all USOs in the South East of England being
able to benefit from the traditional perspective on spatial proximity benefits. A
subgroup of premier league, more prestigious, star universities in the region (Huggins,
2008) are likely to possess the network and technology-transfer officer (TTO) experi-
ence resources to access external finance. The array of services and infrastructure
associated with elite commercialisation systems promoting USOs in Cambridge [Garnsey
and Heffernan (2005); for an alternative view see Breznitz (2011)], Oxford (Lawton
Smith and Ho, 2006), and Imperial College (Nicolaou and Birley, 2003) are discussed
elsewhere. This raises the following questions concerning our understanding of the role
of spatial proximity effects, the answers to which have important policy implications.
Is access to formal VC even more concentrated within strong economic regions than
generally believed, so that only USOs drawn from star universities in these regions
can access VC? Alternatively, do attributes relating to the resources and signals of
universities and USOs play a central role in accessing formal VC even outside strong
economic regions? If research reputations of universities and star academics can reduce
risk perceived by formal VC firms, USOs located outside star universities in the South
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East of England (including London) need to send additional positive signals of quality
relating to the resources of their USOs. As a result of information asymmetries between
academic entrepreneurs and formal VC firms, entrepreneurs (and supporting TTOs)
who do not provide adequate positive founder and firm resource signals may be unable
to obtain required formal VC.
The contribution of this study is to explore the applicability of the traditional
spatial proximity effects view to explain the take-up of formal VC by USOs in the
United Kingdom, which has an economically core region in which formal VC firms
are predominantly located. Building upon the resource-based view (RBV) of the
firm and signalling theory, we extend prior research on spatial mismatches between
investors and investees (Babcock-Lumish, 2009). We propose that USO signallers
located outside the South East of England and star golden-triangle universities
(ie, Cambridge, Oxford, Imperial College London, Kings College London, and University
College London) can compensate for the weaker reputation of their localities and/or
universities by sending observable, credible, and costly high-quality resource signals to
reduce information asymmetry in order to increase the likelihood of obtaining a first
formal VC.
Contrasting with previous USO studies, in which cross-sectional databases were
used (Rothaermel et al, 2007), we explore a unique longitudinal dataset involving the
population of 579 USOs founded in the United Kingdom between 1990 and 2007,
combining archival and survey data from a survey carried out in 2008. Event-history
analysis identifies factors related to USOs' ability to obtain a first formal VC.
We provide fresh evidence challenging traditional perspectives on spatial proximity
benefits, because we detect that USOs located outside the South East of England
were more likely to obtain formal VC. Also, counter to the spatial proximity benefits
view, star golden-triangle USOs were not significantly more likely to obtain VC. The
evidence presented supports a spatial mismatch view between investors and investees.
Resource-combination signals sent by USOs and favourably received by VC firms
differ according to USO location context. USOs located outside the South East
of England and `star' golden triangle universities that signal the credible presence of
habitual founders were more likely to obtain VC. USOs located outside star golden-
triangle universities which had previously obtained publicly backed equity finance were
also more likely to obtain VC. However, USOs located in the South East of England
with reputable management teams were most likely to obtain VC.
2 Theoretical insights and hypotheses
2.1 Signalling theory and RBV of the firm
Signalling theorists reject the assumption of perfect information held by signallers
(ie, USOs) and receivers (ie, VC firms). Information asymmetries between USOs and
VC firms may adversely affect the ability of USOs to obtain formal VC. Acquiring
information in order to resolve informational asymmetries is costly because signaller attri-
butes may not be readily observable, and the receiver is reliant upon what the signaller is
willing to share (Spence, 2002). Signalling theory focuses on the credible communication
of positive information to convey positive organisational attributes. Signal quality con-
cerns the underlying, unobservable ability of the signaller to fulfill the demands of
an outsider observing the signal (Connelly et al, 2011). The signal highlights the
unobservable quality of the signaller to potential receivers via the observable qualities
of the signaller. Receivers such as VC firms need to distinguish between high-quality
and low-quality signallers. High-quality USOs which signal may receive payoff A,
but only payoff B when they do not signal, whilst low-quality USOs receive payoff C
when they signal and payoff D when they do not signal (Kirmani and Rao, 2000).
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Signalling is a viable strategy for high-quality USOs when A>B and when D>C.
With regard to this separating equilibrium context, receivers (ie, VC firms) are able to
distinguish between high-quality and low-quality USOs. Conversely, with reference to a
pooling equilibrium context, when high-quality and low-quality USOs benefit from
signalling (ie, A>B and when C>D), receivers are not able to differentiate between
high-quality and low-quality USOs (Connelly et al, 2011).
VC investors may ignore USOs that do not provide adequate information about the
quality of the business idea and the management team, potential rewards, and risks. To
increase the likelihood of obtaining VC, USOs can provide positive, costly resource
signals of credibility, experience, and quality to formal VC firms seeking high-quality
proposals to invest in.
We draw upon the RBV of the firm as a conceptual framework which identifies the
resources which entrepreneurial firms need to signal to potential formal VC investors.
The RBV focuses upon the heterogeneous pool of idiosyncratic resources, which need
to be valuable, rare, nonimitable, and nonsubstitutable to ensure competitive advantage
(Barney, 1991). They include the following. Firm-specific human resources relate to the
management know-how and entrepreneurial experience of the founder and/or founding
team. Social capital resources provide important sources for knowledge acquisition
and learning from partners and contacts (Yli-Renko et al, 2001), which can be lever-
aged to mobilise further resources that would be otherwise beyond reach. Intellectual
capital and technology embodied in patents may provide unique resources that enable
entry into new product or technology markets to generate superior revenues or capital
gains.
2.2 Derivation of hypotheses
2.2.1 USO location
We begin by building on the traditional spatial proximity effects view that suggests
that all USOs located in the South East of England (including London) have the
potential to leverage the resource provided by being located close to the London
financial centre to access finance from formal VC firms, which exhibit a distance-
decay effect in their investment behaviour. Our first research question suggests that
not all universities located in South East England have developed the networks to
leverage potential spatial proximity benefits (Huggins, 2008). USOs drawn from star
golden-triangle universities in the South East of England benefiting from the associ-
ated reputational, infrastructure, and strong social capital network resources may
provide additional credible signals that increase their ability to obtain VC relative to
other USOs located in the South East of England and the rest of the United Kingdom.
Hence:
Hypothesis 1a: USOs located outside the South East of England will be less likely to obtain
first formal VC investment (FFVCI).
Hypothesis 1b: USOs located outside the star golden-triangle universities in the South East
of England will be less likely to obtain FFVCI.
2.2.2 Resource-interaction effects compensating for spatial proximity benefits
Our second research question suggests that attributes relating to the resources and
signals of universities and USOs may play a central role in accessing formal VC,
even outside strong economic regions. To address a potential distance-decay effect in
formal VC supply, USOs not drawn from the South East of England nor among the
star golden-triangle universities may invest in founder and USO resources (Packalen,
2007), leading to compounded, credible, high-quality signals that compensate for
locational and university reputational disadvantages.
284 C Mueller, P Westhead, M Wright
2.2.2.1 Academic entrepreneur human capital. USOs involving academic entrepreneurs
can possess human capital resources important for venture development. A record of
outstanding work in hard science provides a high-quality signal (Shane and Stuart, 2002)
that suggests that the entrepreneur knows the true value of the proposed idea, and has the
knowledge required to implement it (Zhang, 2009). USOs with founding teams with a
range of skills, capabilities, experience, and knowledgeöparticularly entrepreneurial and
management-experience endowmentöare generally better equipped to develop and exploit
new ideas (Gruber et al, 2012). Management teams with diverse skills provide credible
high-quality signals sought by VC providers (Hsu, 2007).
Formal VC firms look for experienced entrepreneurs (Wright et al, 1997) making
costly investments in honing their entrepreneurial expertise. These entrepreneurs may
have broader and more developed know-how, entrepreneurial capabilities, networks
and reputations, and a proven track record of dealing with liabilities of newness
(Ozgen and Baron, 2007). Experienced founders may have tested alternative
approaches and learnt which are more likely to work. Founders with prior business-
ownership experience more likely have greater knowledge aiding understanding of their
technology, market, and customers, which enables VC investors to reduce operational
risks.
USOs located outside the South East of England and the star golden-triangle
universities can compensate for potential locational and university reputational bene-
fits by sending observable human capital signals to reduce information asymmetry
perceived by potential formal VC investors. Hence:
Hypothesis 2a: USOs located outside the South East of England or the star golden-
triangle universities that signal academic professor status will be more likely to obtain
FFVCI.
Hypothesis 2b: USOs located outside the South East of England or the star golden-
triangle universities that signal the presence of a reputable management team will be
more likely to obtain FFVCI.
Hypothesis 2c: USOs located outside the South East of England or the star golden-
triangle universities that signal the presence of a habitual entrepreneur key founder who
had started a business before will be more likely to obtain FFVCI.
2.2.2.2 Networks and social capital. Deep-bonding social capital provides an important
resource that facilitates USO formation and growth (Iyer et al, 2005). University
networks can facilitate academic entrepreneurs' networks, and may provide a high-
quality signal. Continued interaction between a university and a formal VC firm provides
a credible quality signal to investors. USOs from universities with a tradition of USO
activities can leverage established network links between the university and VC firms
(Nicolaou and Birley, 2003). Many universities outside the star golden-triangle
universities have invested in bottom-up low-selection and high-support models towards
technology-transfer policy. Through investment in incubators, science parks, and TTOs,
many universities outside the star golden-triangle universities have proactively sought to
change the behaviour of USOs in their localities to become more commercially oriented
(Clarysse et al, 2005). By encouraging networking, USOs have broadened their social
capital. Hence:
Hypothesis 2d: USOs located outside the South East of England or the star golden-
triangle universities that have invested in networking activities and are drawn from
universities with a network of previously formally VC-funded USOs will be more likely
to obtain FFVCI.
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2.2.2.3 Intellectual capital and technology resources. Costly investment in patenting can
signal commitment and credibility to VC firms (Hsu, 2007). Formal VC firms prefer to
invest in USOs with patent-protected intellectual resources that create valuable
intangible assets (Baum and Silverman, 2004). USOs outside the golden triangle
investing in patents can reduce risk and information-asymmetry problems perceived
by formal VC firms. Hence:
Hypothesis 2e: USOs located outside the South East of England or the star golden-
triangle universities that have invested in patented IP will be more likely to obtain FFVCI.
USOs investing in radical technologies may reap first-mover advantages. Whilst
many VC firms want to invest in high-growth-potential firms, some are reluctant to
invest in USOs because they are perceived to carry higher risks. Concern may relate
to whether the radical innovation involved will be accepted by sufficient customers,
plus issues relating to potential market size and competitor response (Lockett et al,
2002). Universities outside the star golden triangle are less likely to employ `star'
scientists, and their technology-transfer policies may generate more USOs which are
less engaged in radical innovation. Hence:
Hypothesis 2f: USOs located outside the South East of England or the star golden-triangle
universities with main products or services that are not radical will be more likely to obtain
FFVCI.
2.2.2.4 Publicly backed equity finance (PBEF). Some USOs located outside the South
East of England and the star golden-triangle universities benefit from the activities of
local enterprise and development agencies seeking to address barriers to the ability
of USOs to obtain PBEF (Wright et al, 2006). Public sector financing can play a role in
reducing the information asymmetries perceived by formal VC firms (Huggins, 2008).
PBEF investors may become closely involved in developing strategies and control systems
in investee firms with incomplete management teams. Further, PBEF investors may
require investee firms to develop sound control mechanisms. These resources from PBEF
can be used by a USO to signal commitment, expertise and credibility to future external
investors. Hence:
Hypothesis 2g: USOs located outside the South East of England or the star golden-
triangle universities that have invested in obtaining PBEF and the associated governance
structures and credibility associated with PBEF will be more likely to obtain FFVCI.
3 Data collection and research methodology
3.1 Sample, data collection, and respondents
USOs were identified from the Library House (now Dow Jones) database, which is
not widely publicly available. Library House define USOs as start-ups dependent on
the formal transfer of IP rights from the university (Lawton Smith and Ho, 2006;
Wright et al, 2006), but the university still holds an equity stake. The population of
579 USOs in the United Kingdom founded during the period 1990 to 2007, the most
active period in USO formation, was identified.
Library House, Companies House, FAME, and the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI)
databases were explored to identify information relating to each USO's status, market size,
industry context, and prior take-up of external financing. The esp@cenet database was
used to identify the annual number of patents filed by each USO. No information
was publicly available on human capital profiles of USO founders and USOs networks.
An online survey designed to collect this information was sent in February ^March
2008 to key founders in each USO; e-mail addresses were obtained from Library House
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and an Internet search. Returns were obtained from 134 respondents, with a response
rate of 23%öhigher than similar studies (Becheikh et al, 2006). A firm is defined as
surviving if still in business by the start of 2008. In total, 125 USOs had survived and
9 had closed. The 93.3% survival rate is consistent with USO studies in the United
States (94.4%) (Zhang, 2009). No USOs had been acquired.
A panel database was created with annual observations for the period of USO
formations and formal VC funding events between 1990 and 2007. Event-history
analysis was used to identify factors significantly related to USOs' ability to obtain
first formal VC.
3.2 Sample representation
Mann Whitney `U '-tests confirmed no statistically significant response bias between
respondents and nonrespondents regarding firm age, total disclosed funding, funding
events, year of most recent external investment, total average of years until first
external investment, and number of previous USOs from the university of origin.
Chi-square tests confirmed no statistically significant response bias between respond-
ents and nonrespondents regarding region of origin, industry, university of origin,
whether the university was a member of the leading Russell Group, and whether the
USO was from a star golden-triangle university. The Russell Group comprises twenty
leading research-led universities that receive two thirds of research grants and contract
funding in the United Kingdom. We believe our sample is representative of the USO
population in the United Kingdom.
3.3 Measures
3.3.1 Dependent variable
Key founders were asked for the percentage distribution of equity ownership in their
USOs regarding the following categories: your share (1), management (2), university
(3), other companies (4), venture capitalists (5), business angels (6), public funds (7),
hybrid public and private equity funds (8), IPO (public shares) (9), and other (10). For
USOs obtaining finance from formal venture capitalists (category 5), the timing of VC
investment between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 2007 was cross-checked with
Library House information. Key founders reporting that 1% or more of their USO's
equity was owned by formal VC firms (category 5 above) were allocated a value of `1',
and `0' otherwise (First VC Funding).
3.3.2 Independent variables
Databases were used to identify each USO's main operational premises. USOs located
in the South East of England (including London) standard region were allocated a
value of `1', and `0' otherwise (SEL). USOs located in star golden-triangle universities
were allocated a value of `1', and `0' otherwise (GTL). Following Yip and Tsang (2007),
variables relating to `non-South-East-of-England' and `non-golden-triangle' location
were computed. USOs not located in the South East of England were allocated a value
of `1', and `0' otherwise (NSEL). Further, USOs not located in the golden triangle were
allocated a value of `1', and `0' otherwise (NGTL).
Interaction effects (Yip and Tsang, 2007) were explored with regard to SEL and
NSEL as well as GTL and NGTL. The following interaction variables relating to USO
location outside the South East of England were computed by multiplying USO NSEL
with each USO internal resource-profile signal: NSEL6Professor, NSEL6Team, NSEL6
Habitual, NSEL6Ties, NSEL6Patent, NSEL6Radicalness, and NSEL6PBEF. Each
interaction variable was computed with regard to USO SEL. Interaction variables for
NGTL and GTL were also computed.
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3.3.3 Control variables
Firm age (in years) is the time between the founding year and the year of obtaining
first formal VC for the 72 USOs with a first formal VC. Some 62 USOs failed to obtain
formal VC, and their age was monitored from their founding year to 31 December
2007.
Industry environments differ regarding entry costs, average performance, reinvest-
ment intensity, and sunk costs, which may influence an entrepreneur's ability to
provide quality signals about potential market size to VC investors. Databases were
used to identify each USO's primary industrial activity. USOs primarily engaged in
pharmaceuticals or biotechnology are likely to differ from USOs in other sectors
due to their higher investment needs and longer time-to-market. USOs engaged in
pharmaceuticals or biotechnology were allocated a value of `1', and `0' otherwise
(Pharmabio).
Market size in terms of employee numbers in each USO's primary four-digit
industry code was collected from the Office for National Statistics. For USOs obtain-
ing formal VC, market-size information was annually monitored from the founding
year to the year in which they obtained their first formal VC. The market size of USOs
that did not obtain formal VC was monitored between the founding year and
31 December 2007. Data on annual number of employees in each industry was log
transformed (Log Market Size).
Cyclical effects can shape VC supply. The annual amount of VC for early-stage
investments in the United Kingdom was monitored during the period 2000 ^ 07; these
figures were log transformed (Annual VC Supply). The annual rate of return (percent)
from early-stage VC investments in the United Kingdom was also collected from British
Venture Capital Association (BVCA) publications covering the period 2000^ 07 (Annual
VC Return).
USOs obtaining formal VC during the period 1990 ^ 2000, associated with the new
economy, may have benefited from an increasingly `hot' period in the technology and
investment cycle, and greater VC investment interest. During the long period of
economic growth throughout the 1990s, governments sought to encourage the creation
of new technology based firms (Bank of England, 2001). This hot period culminated in
the peak of the so-called `dot.com boom' in 2000, following which formal VC invest-
ments fell [see BVCA annual Investment Activity Reports (eg, BVCA, 2010)]. Financiers
have sought to hedge their risk due to overvalued investments (Lockett et al, 2002).
Structural breaks and macroeconomic shocks can shape whether USOs obtained a first
formal VC. USOs obtaining formal VC prior to 1st January 2000 were allocated a
value of `1', and `0' otherwise (VC Pre-2000). USOs that had survived as independent
firms by 2008 were allocated a value `1', and `0' otherwise (Survival).
Each key founder indicated whether they had been a full university professor when
the USO had been established. Founders reporting that they had been professors were
allocated a value of `1', and `0' otherwise (Professor).
Statements relating to reputation, to deal with risk and information-asymmetry
problems, were identified (Podolny, 1993). Key founders were presented with the
following statements about the founding team: `at least one member of the team had
founded a successful company before'; `we expected our team would be credible to
potential investors'; `a trusted third party believed our team could successfully start a
company'; and `we thought that our team's experience would be attractive to potential
investors'. The following five-point Likert scale was used: `strongly disagree' (1),
`disagree' (2), `neither agree nor disagree' (3), `agree' (4), and `strongly agree' (5). A
principal components analysis (PCA) identified a conceptually meaningful component.
The Bartlett test of sphericity was significant at the 0.001 level (w2  544:02).
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The Kaiser ^Meyer ^Olkin (KMO) measure of 0.81 concerning sampling adequacy
was sufficient. The scale had a Cronbach's a of 0.91. Component scores relating to
this valid and reliable scale were computed (Team).
Key founders indicated whether they had started at least one firm before the
surveyed USO (Shane and Stuart, 2002): founders indicating they had started a firm
before were allocated a value of `1', and `0' otherwise (Habitual).
The Library House database was used to assess indirect ties (Podolny, 1993) by
calculating the percentage of previous USOs which had already obtained formal VC
located at the same university. The percentage of indirect ties was monitored annually
between the founding year and the year of obtaining the first formal VC for USOs
which did obtain VC. The percentage of indirect ties was monitored annually between
the founding years and 31 December 2007 for USOs which did not obtain a first
formal VC. The percentage rate of indirect ties was normalised using the following
ten categories: `0 to 10%' (1), `11 to 20%' (2), `21 to 30%' (3), `31 to 40%' (4), `41 to
50%' (5), `51 to 60%' (6), `61 to 70%' (7), `71 to 80%' (8), `81 to 90%' (9), and `91
to 100%' (10) (Ties).
Key founders indicated whether they had filed at least one patent in the name of
the USO prior to attracting the first formal VC (Hsu, 2007). From the year in which
USOs had filed for at least one patent, they were allocated a value of `1' for all their
annual observations. Annual observations of USOs not filing any patents were allo-
cated a value of `0' (Patent). Responses were cross-checked with information held on
the esp@cenet European Patent Office database.
Marvel and Lumpkin (2007) developed an innovation radicalness construct with
regard to the following statements: `large group of customers already use a very similar
product/service'; `product/service represents an entirely new type of product/service';
`the product/service may be described as a new technology'; `product/service is a
gradual progression upon the last generation'; `product/service is a product-line exten-
sion'; `product/service satisfies a need not met by competitors'; and `product/service is
a new twist on an old theme'. The following four-point Likert scale was used: `strongly
disagree' (1), `disagree' (2), `agree' (3), and `strongly agree' (4). For each USO, responses
were allocated to each statement based on the objective and consistent secondary
company report information held on the Library House database. A PCA identified
a conceptually meaningful component relating to the following market risk from
radical innovation statements: `large group of customers already use a very similar
product/service'; `product/service represents an entirely new type of product/service';
`product/service satisfies a need not met by competitors'; and `product/service is a new
twist on an old theme'. The Bartlett test of sphericity was significant at the 0.001 level
(w2  80:76). The KMO measure of 0.67 was sufficient. The scale had a Cronbach's a
of 0.65. Component scores relating to this valid and reliable scale were computed
(Radicalness).
Take-up of PBEF was annually monitored between the founding year and the year
of first formal VC for USOs which obtained formal VC; it was annually monitored
between the founding year and 31 December 2007 for other USOs. Responses were
cross-checked with the Library House database. Key founders indicating that they had
obtained PBEF were allocated a value of `1', and `0' otherwise (PBEF).
3.4 Validity and common-method bias
The online questionnaire was tested during a pilot survey. Practitioner conferences
relating to USOs and start-up financing were attended to ensure understanding of
USO financing needs. An early version was revised in line with comments from two
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academic entrepreneurs. To check face validity, ten academic entrepreneurs were
contacted and comments from this pilot were incorporated in a revised questionnaire.
Common-method bias was minimised through protection of respondent anonym-
ity; reducing statement ambiguity by pretesting; a short structured questionnaire that
would encourage accurate responses; and statements relating to the dependent variable
were not located close to control variables. Variables were also collected from various
archival data sources: Library House, Companies House, FAME, ABI, and esp@cenet.
Responses from one data source were validated with responses from an alternative
source.
3.5 Survivor bias
No significant differences between the 517 USO survivors and the 62 closed USOs
up to the 31 December 2007 were detected with regard to the following widely used
firm survival measures: USO region, sector, university Russell Group membership, and
survival of surveyed respondents (w2 tests); firm age, number of funding events,
and amount of formal VC (Mann ^Whitney `U ' tests). In all reported models, firm
survival was consistently not found to be significant. With regard to these indicators,
there is no evidence to suggest that the results are distorted by firm-survivor bias.
3.6 Data analysis
Event-history analysis models are reported to test our presented hypotheses (Blossfeld
et al, 2007). All models were significant at the 0.001 level. Base models (ie, control and
location variables) and full models (ie, control, location, and interaction variables) are
presented relating to USO location in the South East of England (SEL). Sensitivity
analysis models were then computed for USO location outside the South East of
England (NSEL). Models were also computed for NGTL and GTL.
4 Results
Some 72 USOs (54%) had obtained a first formal VC. Model 1 relates to the control
variables and SEL (table 1). Older USOs and USOs engaged in pharmaceuticals or
biotechnology (Pharmabio) were significantly less likely to obtain formal VC. High
annual amounts of VC for early-stage investments (Annual VC Supply), and the supply
of finance during the hot periods in the technology and investment cycle (VC Pre-2000)
significantly increased the likelihood of obtaining VC. USOs with strong indirect ties to
VC firms (Ties), USOs filing at least one patent (Patent), and with professors as
founders (Professor) were significantly more likely to obtain VC. SEL USOs were
significantly less likely to obtain formal VC. Hypothesis H1a is thus not supported.
SEL, SEL interaction variables, and control variables were explored in model 2.
Positive significant SEL6Team and negative significant SEL6Habitual interactions
were detected. USOs with reputable management teams in the South East of England were
more likely to obtain VC. NSEL, NSEL interaction variables, and control variables
were explored in model 3. Negative significant NSEL6Team and positive significant
NSEL6Habitual interactions were detected. USOs located outside the South East
of England and with habitual founders were significantly more likely to obtain
formal VC.
Since the dependent and independent variables are binary in a logarithmic
form, the marginal effects reported in table 1 are the odds (Cameron and Trivedi,
2005) of obtaining VC, for example, given the presence of habitual founders. The
NSEL6Habitual interaction increased the odds of obtaining VC by 2.8 (model 3), whilst
the SEL6Team interaction increased the odds of obtaining VC by 1.0 (model 2). Here,
hypothesis H2c is supported.
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Model 4 relates to the control variables and GTL (table 2). Older USOs were
significantly less likely to obtain formal VC. High annual amounts of VC for early
stage investments (Annual VC Supply), and the supply of finance during the hot periods
in the technology and investment cycle (VC Pre-2000) significantly increased the like-
lihood of obtaining VC. USOs with strong indirect ties to VC firms (Ties), USOs filing
at least one patent (Patent), with professors as founders (Professor), and reputable
management teams (Teams) were significantly more likely to obtain VC. Although
not statistically significant, GTL USOs were less likely to obtain VC. Hypothesis H1b
is thus not supported.
Table 1. Ability of university spin-out (USO) to obtain first formal venture capital (VC)
investmentöSouth East of England (SEL) location: event-history analysis models.
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE
Location
SEL ÿ1.01* 0.43 1.93 1.16
NSEL ÿ1.93 1.16
Interaction SEL
SEL6Professor ÿ0.05 0.61
SEL6Team 1.02* 0.45
SEL6Habitual ÿ3.79*** 1.24
SEL6Ties ÿ0.09 0.17
SEL6Patent ÿ0.95 0.78
SEL6Radicalness 0.31 0.35
SEL6PBEF ÿ0.85 0.71
Interaction NSEL
NSEL6Professor 0.05 0.60
NSEL6Team ÿ1.02* 0.45
NSEL6Habitual 2.82*** 0.73
NSEL6Ties 0.09 0.17
NSEL6Patent 0.87 0.66
NSEL6Radicalness ÿ0.31 0.35
NSEL6PBEF 0.78 0.59
Control variables
Firm age ÿ2.16*** 0.20 ÿ2.20*** 0.21 ÿ2.20*** 0.21
Pharmabio ÿ0.86* 0.40 ÿ0.79* 0.38 ÿ0.79* 0.38
Log Market Size 0.31 0.19 0.36 0.20 0.36 0.20
Annual VC Supply 0.50*** 0.15 0.49*** 0.15 0.49*** 0.15
Annual VC Return ÿ1.03 1.49 ÿ1.12 1.50 ÿ1.12 1.50
VC Pre-2000 3.28*** 0.56 3.44*** 0.56 3.44*** 0.56
Firm Survival ÿ1.26 1.09 ÿ0.82 0.97 ÿ0.82 0.97
Professor 0.80* 0.34 0.76 0.43 0.71 0.47
Team 0.39 0.21 ÿ0.05 0.22 0.98** 0.39
Habitual ÿ0.01 0.38 1.44** 0.54 ÿ1.77** 0.64
Ties 0.37*** 0.10 0.36*** 0.12 0.27 0.15
Patent 1.58*** 0.46 1.93*** 0.55 1.07 0.57
Radicalness 0.10 0.16 0.01 0.21 0.32 0.29
PBEF 0.32 0.33 0.90* 0.42 0.11 0.50
Wald w2 238.98*** 260.22*** 260.22***
Log-likelihood ÿ48.67 ÿ38.04 ÿ38.04
* p < 0:05; **<p < 0:01; ***p < 0:001 (two-tailed tests).
Notes: 134 USOs with 696 annual observations between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 2007;
dy/dx  marginal effects; SE  standard errors.
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GTL, GTL interaction variables, and control variables were explored in model 5.
Negative significant GTL6Habitual and GTL6PBEF interactions were detected. NGTL,
NGTL interaction variables, and control variables were explored in model 6. Positive
significant GTL6Habitual and GTL6PBEF interactions were detected. USOs located
outside the star golden-triangle universities with habitual founders were significantly
more likely to obtain formal VC. Also, USOs with prior publicly backed equity finance
were more likely to obtain VC. The NGTL6Habitual interaction increased the odds
of obtaining VC by 2.6, whilst the NGTL6PBEF interaction increased the odds of
obtaining VC by 1.3 (model 6). Hypotheses H2c and H2g are supported.
Table 2. Ability of university spin-out (USO) to obtain first formal venture capital (VC)
investmentö`star' golden-triangle location (GTL): event-history analysis.
Independent variable Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE
Location
GTL ÿ0.66 0.39 1.12 1.44
NGTL ÿ1.12 1.44
Interaction GTL
GTL6Professor 0.48 0.65
GTL6Team 0.69 0.44
GTL6Habitual ÿ3.39** 1.21
GTL6Ties 0.05 0.21
GTL6Patent ÿ0.57 0.77
GTL6Radicalness 0.08 0.40
GTL6PBEF ÿ1.46* 0.85
Interaction NGTL
NGTL6Professor ÿ0.50 0.72
NGTL6Team ÿ0.69 0.44
NGTL6Habitual 2.58*** 0.73
NGTL6Ties ÿ0.05 0.21
NGTL6Patent 0.54 0.69
NGTL6Radicalness ÿ0.08 0.40
NGTL6PBEF 1.25* 0.63
Control variables
Firm age ÿ2.16*** 0.21 ÿ2.06*** 0.19 ÿ2.06*** 0.19
Pharmabio ÿ0.76 0.41 ÿ0.55 0.38 ÿ0.55 0.38
Log Market Size 0.32 0.20 0.31 0.20 0.31 0.20
Annual VC Supply 0.50*** 0.15 0.39*** 0.13 0.39*** 0.13
Annual VC Return ÿ0.82 1.51 ÿ1.06 1.44 ÿ1.06 1.44
VC Pre-2000 3.24*** 0.56 3.10*** 0.51 3.10*** 0.51
Firm Survival ÿ1.27 1.11 ÿ1.04 0.99 ÿ1.04 0.99
Professor 0.77* 0.35 0.56 0.38 1.05 0.60
Team 0.46* 0.21 0.28 0.21 0.97* 0.41
Habitual ÿ0.23 0.37 0.69 0.43 ÿ2.20*** 0.75
Ties 0.33*** 0.10 0.24** 0.08 0.28 0.21
Patent 1.40*** 0.44 1.46*** 0.46 0.93 0.61
Radicalness 0.17 0.16 0.34 0.20 0.42 0.36
PBEF 0.37 0.33 0.98* 0.41 ÿ0.32 0.57
Wald w2 235.45*** 252.00*** 252.00***
Log-likelihood ÿ50.43 ÿ42.16 ÿ42.16
*p < 0:05; **p < 0:01; ***p < 0:001 (two-tailed tests).
Notes: 134 USOs with 696 annual observations between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 2007;
dy/dx  marginal effects; SE  standard errors.
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To explore whether broader university reputational effects were linked to USO
likelihood of obtaining formal VC, models were computed relating to whether USOs were
located in leading research-led Russell Group universities or not. None of the location
or interaction variables was significant. The assumed reputational benefits of Russell
Group universities do not appear to be a key credible signal that is sought by formal
VC firms.
5 Conclusions
Uncovering linkages between a USO's resource profile (ie, signals) and its ability to
obtain formal VC is of considerable theoretical and practical relevance. Our analysis
challenges the traditional perspective that spatial proximity benefits can be leveraged
by USOs located in the South East of England (particularly those drawn from star
golden-triangle universities with additional reputational benefits), and that USOs
located elsewhere will be constrained from obtaining their first formal VC. In answer
to our first research question, we do not find evidence to suggest that access to formal
VC is even more concentrated within strong economic regions than is generally
believed so that only USOs drawn from star universities in these regions can access
VC. However, we do find support for our second research question that suggests that
USOs not located in the South East of England or located in star golden-triangle
universities have to send additional positive signals of quality relating to the resources
of their USOs. Notably, we detect that the resources and signals of entrepreneurs and
USOs play a central role in accessing formal VC outside strong economic regions.
Consistent with a spatial mismatch view between investors and investees (Babcock-
Lumish, 2009), rather than a spatial proximity effects view, SEL USOs were significantly
less likely to obtain formal VC. The selective approach adopted by some star golden-
triangle universities appears to be reducing the likelihood that more USOs drawn from
these contexts will obtain formal VC, which may potentially impair firm and local
economic development (Breznitz, 2011).
Our examination of whether USOs located outside the South East of England
(or not drawn from star golden-triangle universities) compensate for the absence of
spatial proximity benefits by combining NSEL (or NGTL) with founder and USO
resources to signal credible quality to VC firms shows that SEL and NGTL USOs that
exhibited resource-substitution behaviour increased their likelihood of obtaining
formal VC. We thus extend prior research by showing that the resource-combination
signals sent by USOs and favourably received by VC firms were found to differ
according to the USO location context. USOs located outside the South East of England
and star golden-triangle universities that signal the credible presence of habitual founders
were more likely to obtain VC. USOs located outside star golden-triangle universities that
had previously obtained PBEF were also more likely to obtain VC. However, USOs
located in the South East of England with reputable management teams were more likely
to obtain VC. Experience is, therefore, a credible signal sought by formal VC firms
(Politis, 2008).
We extend previous studies by focusing specifically on how differential access
to formal VC may contribute to explaining shortcomings in the policy contribution
of USOs to innovation-led local economic development. Also, we extend prior research
by demonstrating that the USO founder and firm-resource signals provided by NSEL
and NGTL USOs, notably key founder prior business ownership experience, can com-
pensate for potential spatial proximity benefits that could be leveraged by USOs
located in a strong economic region, or the reputational benefits of star golden-triangle
universities located in a strong economic region. Our findings question the view that
USOs from the South East of England and star golden-triangle universities have an
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inbuilt advantage in obtaining formal VC. Rather, attributes relating to the resources
of founders and USOs appear to play a central role in accessing formal VC. Some
formal VC firms are seeking to develop closer relationships with star golden-triangle
universities, but this does not appear to have increased the likelihood of GTL USOs
obtaining VC.VC firms appear to prefer founder experience rather than just university
reputation with regard to their VC-allocation decisions. Additional research is warranted
to explore whether this trend changes over time.
Our findings have implications for policy addressing the locational disadvantages
of NSEL and NGTL USOs. We suggest that the onus is on entrepreneurs to provide the
credible signals sought by formal VC investors. Practitioners in local enterprise agencies,
incubators, science parks, and TTOs may also have a role in encouraging NGTL USOs
to consider strategies that combine resources to facilitate more USOs to provide the
positive credible signals sought by formal VC investors seeking to reduce their risk
exposure whilst also seeking deals with high up-side gains. They have a role in
facilitating local networks that encourage USO founders to internally assemble and
manage costly resource bases that signal USO observable credible quality to formal
VC firms.
Policy measures may promote the provision of PBEF to stimulate more USOs to
subsequently obtain formal VC. We detected that NGTL USOs with prior PBEF were
significantly more likely to obtain VC. Our evidence, therefore, does not consistently
suggest that the take-up of PBEF was a credible quality signal sought and favourably
received by formal VC firms. Additional research is warranted to guide practitioner
resource-allocation decisions relating to this topical debate.
This study has limitations that provide future research opportunities. Our results
can be generalised to the United Kingdom and, potentially, to other contexts where VC
firm offices are concentrated in a core region. Additional research in a variety of
national contexts is warranted to explore the external validity of our findings. Doubt
may be cast on the wider validity of self-report measures, although key-informant
founders can provide reliable information about firm characteristics and the issues
faced (Gruber et al, 2012). To reduce the problem of common-methods bias and to
improve construct validity, studies need to complement information from key inform-
ants with information from secondary sources. Future studies may consider finer
measures of the extent and nature of prior entrepreneurial experience (Ucbasaran
et al, 2010). Additional research is warranted to explore whether firms that obtain
formal VC subsequently report superior levels of performance, whilst controlling for
potential selection-bias issues relating to USO ability to obtain formal VC. The USO
definition selected can impact on the size and composition of the identified and
monitored USO population. Our online survey was conducted in 2008öat the time
of the peak of the formal VC market. After the fall that occurred from the late 2008
through 2009, the VC market improved in 2010önot just in the South East of England
(including London) but also in many regions (BVCA, 2010). To some extent this may
suggest that the market has experienced a general cyclical effect. However, given the
severity of the financial crisis, VC firms may have become more risk averse in their
decisions to invest, reinforcing a need to focus on those entrepreneurs who are able to
signal their greater human capital resource derived from prior entrepreneurial experi-
ence. Additional studies are warranted to explore whether the results presented here
are sensitive to the USO definition operationalised, and the time frame of analysis.
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